Frank Krishner
[THIS PAPER WAS PRESENTED AT THE MADHYA BHARAT AREA 'MILITARY-MEDIA SEMINAR HELD ON 28 MARCH 2007]
The relationship between the Armed Forces and the Media has always been an uneasy one due to their contrasting needs.
The Armed Forces are always prone to secrecy while the media is generally trying to pry open secrets.
Yet, since the Second World War, there has been a worldwide realisation that these two institutions need to coexist to achieve the ultimate goals of the nation.
General Eisenhower wrote in 'Crusade in Europe’, "The commander in the field must never forget that it is his duty to cooperate with the heads of his government in the task of maintaining civilian morale that will be equal to every purpose. The main agency to accomplish this task is the press."
L N Subramanian, in an article “Media as force multiplier” wrote: “In India, we have a poor history of media relations. The Armed Forces closed themselves off and were content with the odd archaic newsreel on the forces. The most glaring example of this early on is the case of the 65 Indo Pak war, which even after a sound thrashing, the Pakistanis got themselves accolades by wining and dining the Western media. However, it is in the arena of internal security operations that poor media relations have really hurt the armed forces, the Government and the country at large.[1]
Constraints of the media
Let’s look at a few basics from the journalist’s point of view.
I cut my journalistic milk teeth in North Bengal, Sikkim, and Meghalaya during the troubled mid eighties and early nineties, and have had the opportunity of seeing reality through the eyes of the ‘small and medium’ newspaper establishment.
Perceptions: In border areas, where the security forces have to battle home-grown insurgency, relationships between the two establishments are at its best wary, and at its worst strained. The Army Jawan and his officer are often viewed as bullies, lacking sensitivity of local customs and respect for women. The army sees civilians and their institutions as tiresome, undisciplined and irritating. It cannot understand why the editors should give space to ‘the enemy’.
The media must be responsible, but to whom? The vernacular media is born of the soil; it reflects the aspirations of the people. The conflict is not black and white. There are shades of grey.
During CI-ops [counter-intelligence operations], the army finds itself in an unenviable position. Much of the troubles one sees are actually manufactured by civilians [the politicians], and over a period of time, when they get out of hand, then the army is called in. It is called upon to execute a job. Contain the insurgency. It expects that journalists support the efforts ‘wholeheartedly’ and ‘serve the nation’, and not wail over a few broken eggs.
Friction results when the local press is seen to be carrying stories and statements from rebels and other local leaders who may not want to toe the government line. It’s a question of perspective: civilians expect negotiated, long term solutions within the ambit of human rights. After all, they share their ethnicity, culture and space with the ‘rebels’.
As for the army, ‘most CI Ops are conducted at the Battalion and lower level and it is at this level that efficiency is understood solely by the body count or 'kills'. Here the broad aim of ending the insurgency gets translated to 'take no prisoners' and exterminating the 'Anti-national Elements' - terminology not without political significance.[2]
The army expects the press to ‘do its duty’ and pass on information to nab the ‘anti-national elements’.
The foot-soldier journalist is also in an unenviable position.
A credible journalist must maintain his links to the sources of information, and has to be trusted by them. He cannot be an ‘informer’. He has to be equidistant from the politicians, the police, the army and the insurgents and yet close enough to be trusted by them so as to get accurate and reliable news. Quite a tightrope performance!
There is also the factor of civilian – armed forces interaction. People living near the army camps sometimes come into conflict with the Jawans, be it over a goat, a brawl, or over the more serious charge of molestation and rape. Reporters trying to investigate will usually come up against a stone wall. The army has its own code, and brooks no interference from the civilian press. Statements are not prompt and forthcoming. Communication gap. The local press reports will portray the army as hostile and insensitive. The army will say that the local press is biased and unfair.
Constraints in power equations:
The vernacular media and the local press are often vulnerable to pressure and threats by militant groups. Local reporters are usually underpaid, existing on shoe-string budgets. Even for the town-based correspondent of a ‘national’ newspaper, it’s imperative that he survives to write his story. The local editor-cum-owner of a small newspaper cannot afford the luxury of having his press burnt down, or his paper boycotted for not publishing a press note by a militant group.
On the other hand, the editors of most local English language papers have cordial relations with the army and security forces. Vernacular papers may not share the same ‘status’ with the local army brass as English language papers.
Constraints of time: The press needs to deliver its news fast. It needs accurate, timely briefing. There are deadlines to be met. Stories cannot be kept on hold indefinitely while one waits for a response from the appropriate Army spokesperson.
The money factor: The press survives on revenue from advertisements. Vernacular and local papers often have no option but to survive on Government advertisements and political patronage. Not much of the budget is available for news-gathering. The main source of news is the wire-service. This is supplemented by the local press-release. The local editor actually needs press releases. Press releases cut down news gathering costs. An army press-release is usually carried.
Lack of expertise: Closely linked to the preceding point, not all media organisations can afford to have a designated reporter who is an ‘army expert’. Covering the military is a different ball-game. For example, not many reporters know what the armed forces do in their UN peace keeping assignments.
To the majority of the vernacular and local language reporters, ‘news’ means whatever they have been assigned to at the moment. Rapport building exercises by the army are largely regarded as a ‘jaunt’, and the expected payoff should be so many inches of column space and a few pictures.
The situation is fast improving with new recruits coming to the profession with degrees in journalism, and the availability of background material on the internet which is just a click away.
Lack of knowledge on military matters: The Civilian press needs to be trained in the technique for military reportage. I illustrate the point by directly quoting Subramanian:
The importance of the media in India’s first television war can be gauged by the fact the Kargil Committee report devoted a separate section to this issue. The report noted that while the coverage was satisfactory, it was apparent that the media lacked training in military matters and the Armed Forces lacked the training to facilitate the task of the media.
Since the MOD information cadre was not up to the task of handling the media, the briefing functions were taken up by a group of senior civil and military spokesmen.
Army HQ set up an Informational and Psychological Warfare Cell with direct access to the Army Chief to monitor and disseminate information in a calibrated manner. While this was in the capital there were no corresponding arrangements at the Corps, Division and Brigade levels. This resulted in wildly inaccurate and speculative reports of intruders capturing a number of Indian Army bunkers, building three storied bunkers with cable TV and buying cement from the Dras – Kargil market. (A similar characteristic observed in reports of the recent arms depot fire at Bharatpur)
The lack of knowledge about military matters resulted in umpteen reports questioning the absence of the army chief away in Poland as well as the Northern Army Commander away in Pune at the same time. These operations were limited to Corps level and were handled as such. [3]
The way ahead: Regular interaction between Army and the Press, along with a tendency towards openness on the part of the army, especially when civilians are involved or hurt or killed as part of the action.
The media should capitalize on the great news potential of the human interest story. The stories of the army men who lost their lives in counter-intelligence operations as newsworthy as those who die in war, but are rarely recognized as such.
The media should train its reporters and correspondents so that there is a better understanding of the working and constraints of the military. This, of course, can only be possible with Army cooperation.
On its part, the military must also examine and respond to such important ‘civilian’ concerns as Human Rights, regular and open briefing, and freedom of expression.
[1] L N Subramanian Article: Media as Force Multiplier Bharat Rakshak Monitor - Volume 2(6) May-June 2000
[2] Bikram Jeet Bhatia Article; A ‘general’ need for reform, May 2005, India Together {website]
[3] L N Subramanian Article: Media as Force Multiplier Bharat Rakshak Monitor - Volume 2(6) May-June 2000
There is also the factor of civilian – armed forces interaction. People living near the army camps sometimes come into conflict with the Jawans, be it over a goat, a brawl, or over the more serious charge of molestation and rape. Reporters trying to investigate will usually come up against a stone wall. The army has its own code, and brooks no interference from the civilian press. Statements are not prompt and forthcoming. Communication gap. The local press reports will portray the army as hostile and insensitive. The army will say that the local press is biased and unfair.
Constraints in power equations:
The vernacular media and the local press are often vulnerable to pressure and threats by militant groups. Local reporters are usually underpaid, existing on shoe-string budgets. Even for the town-based correspondent of a ‘national’ newspaper, it’s imperative that he survives to write his story. The local editor-cum-owner of a small newspaper cannot afford the luxury of having his press burnt down, or his paper boycotted for not publishing a press note by a militant group.
On the other hand, the editors of most local English language papers have cordial relations with the army and security forces. Vernacular papers may not share the same ‘status’ with the local army brass as English language papers.
Constraints of time: The press needs to deliver its news fast. It needs accurate, timely briefing. There are deadlines to be met. Stories cannot be kept on hold indefinitely while one waits for a response from the appropriate Army spokesperson.
The money factor: The press survives on revenue from advertisements. Vernacular and local papers often have no option but to survive on Government advertisements and political patronage. Not much of the budget is available for news-gathering. The main source of news is the wire-service. This is supplemented by the local press-release. The local editor actually needs press releases. Press releases cut down news gathering costs. An army press-release is usually carried.
Lack of expertise: Closely linked to the preceding point, not all media organisations can afford to have a designated reporter who is an ‘army expert’. Covering the military is a different ball-game. For example, not many reporters know what the armed forces do in their UN peace keeping assignments.
To the majority of the vernacular and local language reporters, ‘news’ means whatever they have been assigned to at the moment. Rapport building exercises by the army are largely regarded as a ‘jaunt’, and the expected payoff should be so many inches of column space and a few pictures.
The situation is fast improving with new recruits coming to the profession with degrees in journalism, and the availability of background material on the internet which is just a click away.
Lack of knowledge on military matters: The Civilian press needs to be trained in the technique for military reportage. I illustrate the point by directly quoting Subramanian:
The importance of the media in India’s first television war can be gauged by the fact the Kargil Committee report devoted a separate section to this issue. The report noted that while the coverage was satisfactory, it was apparent that the media lacked training in military matters and the Armed Forces lacked the training to facilitate the task of the media.
Since the MOD information cadre was not up to the task of handling the media, the briefing functions were taken up by a group of senior civil and military spokesmen.
Army HQ set up an Informational and Psychological Warfare Cell with direct access to the Army Chief to monitor and disseminate information in a calibrated manner. While this was in the capital there were no corresponding arrangements at the Corps, Division and Brigade levels. This resulted in wildly inaccurate and speculative reports of intruders capturing a number of Indian Army bunkers, building three storied bunkers with cable TV and buying cement from the Dras – Kargil market. (A similar characteristic observed in reports of the recent arms depot fire at Bharatpur)
The lack of knowledge about military matters resulted in umpteen reports questioning the absence of the army chief away in Poland as well as the Northern Army Commander away in Pune at the same time. These operations were limited to Corps level and were handled as such. [3]
The way ahead: Regular interaction between Army and the Press, along with a tendency towards openness on the part of the army, especially when civilians are involved or hurt or killed as part of the action.
The media should capitalize on the great news potential of the human interest story. The stories of the army men who lost their lives in counter-intelligence operations as newsworthy as those who die in war, but are rarely recognized as such.
The media should train its reporters and correspondents so that there is a better understanding of the working and constraints of the military. This, of course, can only be possible with Army cooperation.
On its part, the military must also examine and respond to such important ‘civilian’ concerns as Human Rights, regular and open briefing, and freedom of expression.
[1] L N Subramanian Article: Media as Force Multiplier Bharat Rakshak Monitor - Volume 2(6) May-June 2000
[2] Bikram Jeet Bhatia Article; A ‘general’ need for reform, May 2005, India Together {website]
[3] L N Subramanian Article: Media as Force Multiplier Bharat Rakshak Monitor - Volume 2(6) May-June 2000
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